Dictum in Garamendi acknowledges some of the issues that may be raised about Zschernig. The Zschernig court did not determine which language in the Constitution and commentators have determined that a respectable argument can be made that the Constitution does not require general action to prevent foreign policy not related to the supremacy clause, and broader than and independently of the specific prohibitions of the Constitution510 and the granting of power.511 The Garamendi Court raised “a fair question of whether respect for executive external relations required a categorical choice between the opposing theories of the field. and the conflicts that arise in Zschernig`s expertise. Instead, Justice Souter told the Court, a pre-purchase opportunity on the ground might be appropriate if a state legislates “simply without claiming a foreign policy without seriously claiming traditional state responsibility,” and the pre-purchase conditions of conflict could be appropriate when a state legislates in a traditional area of responsibility , “but in a way that influences external relations.” 512 We must wait for further litigation to see if the Court applies this distinction.513 First, most judges and scholars have held that executive agreements, based solely on presidential power, do not become the “law of the land” under the supremacy clause, as these agreements are not “treaties” ratified by the Senate.490 However, the Supreme Court has found another basis for enacting state laws through executive agreements. which ultimately relied on the power of the Constitution in matters of external relations within the national government. The challenge of securing a two-thirds majority on contracts was one of the motivations for the huge increase in executive agreements after World War II. In 1952, for example, the United States signed 14 treaties and 291 executive agreements. These were more executive agreements than those concluded during the century from 1789 to 1889. Executive agreements continue to grow rapidly. The largest delegation that Congress has ever undertaken to the President to conclude executive agreements took place in the area of the co-decision powers of the two divisions, the field of foreign relations, and took place at a time when war was within sight and, indeed, a few months away. This Act is the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941,457, which authorized the President to “authorize the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy or the head of another government department or agency for more than two years – and later for other periods, if he deems it in the interest of national defence – to “empower the Minister of War , the Minister of the Navy or the head of another government department or agency.” , to the extent that available funds are available, “defence items” – which were then supplemented by food and industrial products – and “Sale, transfer of ownership, exchange, leasing, loan or other transfer” to “the government of any country whose defence is deemed indispensable by the President for the defence of the United States.” and all the conditions he deems “satisfactory.” As part of this authorization, the United States entered into mutual aid agreements, in which the government provided $40 billion in war munitions and other supplies to its allies during World War II.
Congress was allowed to conclude executive officers early in the negotiations and reach agreements with foreign governments, permission to borrow money from abroad442 and acquire money to pay the government of Algiers to prevent pirate attacks on American shipping.443 Perhaps the first formal authorization in advance of an executive agreement was the adoption of a statute authorizing the postmaster general , “to enter into agreements with postmasters in any foreign country for reciprocal receipt and delivery of letters and parcels through post offices.” 444 Congress also approved, usually by resolution, other executive agreements, such as the annexation of Texas and Hawaii