




# OPERATION SAFER HOTELS

Western Australia Police Force

Presentation by Jesse Parmar




# Why Operation SAFER HOTELS?






# Why Operation SAFER HOTELS?





# Why Operation SAFER HOTELS?





# OPERATION SAFER HOTELS

Experimental Design

**OPERATION SAFER HOTELS assessed the effectiveness of different engagement strategies in closing the ‘intelligence gap’.**

The engagement strategies being:

1. Personal engagement by Intelligence Officers;
2. Engagement via letter correspondence;
3. No engagement whatsoever (BAU).



# OPERATION SAFER HOTELS

Experimental Design- Randomisation Process

123 HOTELS

A large, hollow, downward-pointing arrow is centered below the text '123 HOTELS', indicating a flow or transition to the next step in the process.



# OPERATION SAFER HOTELS

## Experimental Design

123 HOTELS

Key variables collected:

- (A) Total CAD activity at the hotel in a one year period prior.
- (B) Size of the hotel (maximum occupancy)
- (C) 'Quality'- based on online reviews.

Hotels then grouped into TRIPLICATES.

RANDOMISED

**TREATMENT 1**  
PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT

**TREATMENT 2**  
LETTER ENGAGEMENT

**CONTROL GROUP**  
BAU



# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 1: DID ENGAGEMENT INCREASE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING?

## HYPOTHESIS ONE

**Targeted engagement of hotel staff, encouraging the reporting of suspicious drug-related behaviour, will lead to increased intelligence reporting**

### Measures


1. Count of **Intelligence Reports**





# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 1: DID ENGAGEMENT INCREASE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING?



$F(2,120) = 3.149$   
 $p=0.046$

There was a **statistically significant difference** in the number of intelligence reports submitted by hotels across the three engagement strategies.

Subsequent testing found a statistically significant difference between the number of intel. reports submitted from **Treatment 1 hotels** and hotels from the **control group**



# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 2: WERE MORE OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH TREATMENT HOTELS?

## HYPOTHESIS TWO

**Targeted engagement of hotel staff, encouraging the reporting of suspicious behaviour, will lead to an increase in the number of associated offences**


### Measures

1. Count of **offences** associated with hotels by engagement strategy.
2. Count of **incidents**.
3. **Crime Harm**
  - Western Australia CHI (HOUSE & NEYROUD, 2018).



# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 2: WERE MORE OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH TREATMENT HOTELS?



$F(2,120) = 0.590$   
 $p=0.5586$

Treatment 1 hotels were associated with over **twice** as many offences compared to hotels from control group hotels.

However there was still a statistically *non-significant* difference between reported offences across the three engagement strategies.

Why?


The 'power of few' phenomenon.

Five hotel were linked to over half of all reported offences and just 34 hotels (out of  $n=123$ ) produced all reported offences.



# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 2: WERE MORE OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH TREATMENT HOTELS?




The many hotels that were linked to zero offences 'dilute' the statistical power of the outcome.




# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 2: WERE MORE OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH TREATMENT HOTELS?



$F(2,120) = 0.710; p=0.496$



$F(2,120) = 1.220; p=0.298$

Consistent with the findings pertaining to the count of IMS offences the respective engagement strategies- Treatment 1 hotels were associated with a substantially higher number of reported incidents and higher levels of crime harm.


However, as seen before, due to the concentration of offences at a small number of hotels (34 out of 123 hotels) the higher aggregate counts of crime harm and incidents do not translate to statistical significance.



# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 3: WERE MORE OFFENDERS IDENTIFIED?

### Count of Hotel/Offender Identifications



$$F(2,120) = 1.046$$
$$p=0.355$$

Over twice as many offender identifications occurred at Treatment 1 hotels compared to Treatment 2 hotels.

Compared to the Control Group, this discrepancy was even more sizeable, with over four times as many offenders identified.

However, once again, due to the concentration of offenders identified at particular hotels, there was no statistically significant difference between the engagement strategies.


All 37 identifications occurred at 11% of hotels (15 hotels)



# Operation SAFER HOTELS

Hypothesis 3: WERE MORE OFFENDERS IDENTIFIED?

### Approximate Value of Drugs Seized



### DISCLAIMERS

The data relies on accuracy of IMS property data.

The approximate costs of drugs predicated on latest ACIC (2017) *Illicit Drug Data Report*.

Nearly \$11,000 worth of drugs was seized from Treatment 1 hotels, nearly twice that seized from Treatment 2 hotels.

However, the substantial variance within the groups means that there was no statistically significant difference between the groups.

Of the 123 hotels, the drug seizures came from 7 hotels.



# SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Hotels, personally engaged by Officers were associated with....



**3** X AS MANY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS



**4** X AS MANY IDENTIFIED OFFENDERS.



**3** X AS MUCH CRIME HARM IDENTIFIED



**2** X THE VALUE OF DRUGS SEIZED







# One Year On...

## Did we change operational policing?


### Count of Intelligence Reports




### Count of Offences



### Count of Incidents



### Count of WACHI





# Operation SAFER HOTELS

'Changing Hearts and Minds'

## Changing Operational Policing Lessons from SAFER HOTELS

1. A **PEOPLE** focused strategy.
2. **PARTNERING** with those operationalising the strategies.
3. **PASSION** for the project at a local level.